We estimate hedonic price functions for premium wine from Australia and New Zealand, differentiating implicit prices for sensory quality ratings, wine varieties, and regional as well as winery brand reputations over the vintages 1992 to 2000. For Australia, the results suggest regional reputations in general are becoming increasingly significant through time, i ndicating an intensifying regional quality differentiation. As well, some specific cool-climate regions (e.g. Adelaide Hills, Mornington Peninsula and Tasmania) are becoming increasingly preferred over other regions. Price premiums based on brand reputatio n also are shown to be significant.
Introduction
For more than a dozen years now the wine industry has been booming in Australia and New Zealand. Both the area planted to vineyards and the volume of wine produced have grown at about 7 per cent per year on average since the late 1980s, while the two countries' exports of wine have been growing at more than 20 per cent per year (from a low base).
Simultaneously, wine exports from California, South Africa and the Southern Cone of Latin America have been soaring too, such that the share of global wine production that is exported has risen by more than 50 per cent (Anderson and Berger 1999) . Yet the volume of wine consumption per capita in Australia, New Zealand and globally, has been static. Indeed consumption has been falling steadily in the traditional wine-consuming countries of Europe and the southern cone of South America, offsetting demand growth in the UK, the US, and (from a tiny base) East Asia. In each of these markets, however, as in Australia and New Zealand, there has been a dramatic substitution of quality for quantity: premium (bottled) wine sales are growing steadily while non-premium (cask) sales are in decline (Anderson 2001) .
With global demand static and export supplies from the New World booming, the average price of internationally traded wine is bound to come under pressure to decline in the coming years. In this more-competitive and more-globalized environment, the extent to which the price declines (or rises) for a particular group of producers will depend very much on the quality upgrading of its product, absolutely and relative to that of other producer groups, as perceived by consumers at home and abroad. This raises the question of what determines the consumer's perception of quality when they buy wine. 1 In particular, what are the market values of such things as the reputation of the producing region as distinct from corporate brand reputation, or grape variety reputation or the published ratings of wine writers/judges/ critics; and how have they evolved over time?
This paper addresses this question as it relates to Australian and New Zealand wines, using a hedonic pricing model. It begins by briefly reviewing the literature on such pricing models and their application to wine. It then presents the model and the two data sets used here and details the empirical results for prices in the Australian and New Zealand markets separately. The final section summarizes what has been learnt and suggests areas for further research.
Literature review
A number of studies apply hedonic price analysis to estimate implicit prices for wine quality attributes. 2 They are based on the hypothesis that any product represents a bundle of characteristics that define quality. Their theoretical foundation is provided in the seminal paper by Rosen (1974) , which posits that goods are valued for their utility-generating attributes. Rosen suggests there are competitive implicit markets that define implicit prices for embodied product attributes, and that consumers evaluate product attributes (e.g. features of a car, indicators of air or water qua lity) when making a purchasing decision. The observed market price is the sum of implicit prices paid for each quality attribute. Rosen also recognizes an identification problem for supply and demand functions derived from hedonic price functions, because implicit prices are equilibrium prices jointly determined by supply and demand conditions. Hence, implicit prices may reflect not only consumer preferences but also factors that determine production. In order to solve the identification proble m it is necessary to separate supply and demand conditions. Arguea and Hsiao (1993) argue that the identification problem is essentially a data issue that can be avoided by pooling cross-section and time-series data specific to a particular side of the market.
straightforward weather variables in the growing season --information that consumers appear to have been ignoring.
Since the quality of a particular bottle of wine cannot be known until it is de-corked and consumed, consumers' willingness to pay depends on reputations associated with that wine. In addition to quality ratings, the reputation of the winery, the wine region and the grape variety(-ies) used also affect wine prices. Shapiro (1983) presents a theoretical framework to examine reputation effects on prices. He develops an equilibrium price-quality schedule for high-quality products, assuming competitive ma rkets and imperfect consumer information, to demonstrate that reputation allows high-quality producers to sell their items at a premium that may be interpreted as revenue for producer investments in building reputation.
On the demand side of the market, it is costly for consumers to improve their information about product quality too. In such an environment of imperfect information, learning about the reputation of a product or of some of its attributes can be an effective way for consumers to reduce their decision-making costs.
Oczkowski (1994) provides one of the first empirical wine studies to adopt this reputation approach using a hedonic pricing model. He estimates a log-linear function for premium Australian table wine, relating retail prices to six attribute groups and various interaction terms.
Nerlove (1995) examines the Swedish wine market, which is characterized by no domestic production, a small share of global consumption, and government control of prices.
This allows him to presume that prices are exogenous (as opposed to assuming supply is exogenous) and to estimate a reduced form hedonic price function, regressing quantities sold on various quality attributes and prices. Thus, Nerlove assumes that wine consumers in Sweden express their valuation of a particular quality attribute by varying the derived hedonic demand for it.
Golan and Shalit (1993) identify and evaluate quality characteristics for wine grapes produced in Israel relative to California wine. That is, they analyze hedonic grape pricing of the input supply side of the wine market. Their premise is that high-quality wines are produced only when growers are given a strong enough price incentive to supply better grapes. In a two-stage model, they first develop a quality index by evaluating the (relative)
contributions of various physical grape attributes to wine quality. Second, they construct a quality-price function relating the price of Californian wine to the quality index developed in the first stage. Analogous to Nerlove, they also assume that prices are exogenous.
Combris, Lecocq and Visser (1997) In another empirical application to Australian wines, Oczkowski (2000) estimates hedonic price functions for wine assuming attribute measurement errors. He finds significant reputation effects but insignificant quality effects.
A recent working paper by Roberts and Reagans (2001) examines market experience, consumer attention, and price-quality relationships for New World wines in the U.S. market.
They argue that the attention paid to wine quality signals increases with the market experience its producer and, because of spillover effects, with the experience of associated producers.
In an analysis of the U.S. wine market, Schamel (2000) estimates a hedonic pricing model based on sensory quality ratings, individual wine quality and regional reputation indicators for two premium wine varieties: a white (Chardonnay) and a red (Cabernet Sauvignon). The paper examines seven regions (Napa and Sonoma Valley, Sonoma County, Oregon, Washington State, Australia, Chile, South Africa) and includes observations from a pool of eight vintages between 1988 and 1995. However, it does not estimate coefficients for individual vintages. The estimated price elasticity of sensory quality is larger for white wine, indicating that U.S. consumers were willing to pay a higher quality premium for white compared to red wine at that time. However, the results suggest both regional reputation and individual quality indicators seem to be more important to U.S. consumers of red wine. The results also suggest that the marketing of regional origin as a reputation attribute may have a higher payoff for regions primarily growing red wine. In other words, it seems that the publicgood value of a regional appellation is higher for red wine regions and that individual producers in those regions may benefit more from collective marketing efforts.
The present paper extends the authors' recent hedonic pricing model used to analyze various reputation indicators for premium wines from Australia and New Zealand (Schamel and Anderson 2001) . That earlier paper individually examined recent vintages (1992-1998) in addition to the data sets as a whole for each country, using a data set developed by Halliday (1999a,b) . In the present paper, we extend that work by analyzing an additional data set of more than 12,500 tasting scores for premium wines for the same two countries (Winestate 2001) . This enables us to compare for the first time hedonic pricing model results for two different data sets drawn from a similar base population of wines and consumers.
Because consumers are uncertain or have incomplete information about wine quality, we hypothesize that, in addition to their own perceptions of grape varieties used and each growing region's reputation as a supplier of premium wine, they use information on wine experts' ratings of particular wines and individual wineries when making their buying decisions.
The data and hedonic price model
The data for Australia and New Zealand. In contrast to the popular 100-point scale for sensory wine quality adopted by Halliday, Winestate uses a 5-star rating scheme, assigning between 3 and 5 stars but also using half-stars. (Some wines have no rating at all, which presumably implies less than 3 stars, so we assigned 2.5 stars for all non-rated wines.) For simplicity, we have given two points for every star, to avoid using decimals. 
The model
Following conventional hedonic models, we propose that a bundle of quality attributes defines any premium wine. Consumer willingness to pay is a function of that bundle of wine quality attributes, which include a critic's sensory quality ratings, winery ratings, grape varieties used, and indicators of regional reputation. Because consumers are uncertain about quality ratings, they use additional information available to judge the quality of a particular wine. Imagine yourself as a consumer looking for a bottle of (recently released) premium wine as a gift or to accompany a meal. You want to buy wine a particular grape variety (e.g., Shiraz) and you are using available information from wine experts about the sensory quality of a particular wine and the winery producing it. (Published vintage and winery ratings are commonly available for perusal in wine shops.) You adjust the expert quality rating and therefore your willingness to pay for a wine to reflect the regional reputation of the growing region as a reliable supplier of premium wine. For example, given an equal expert quality rating of 90 points for a Barossa Valley Shiraz and a Hunter Valley Shiraz, you may be willing to pay less for the Hunter Valley red because you are less certain about whether it will be as good as the expert rating promises. Moreover, an individual quality indicator such as a classic wine rating assigned by wine critics also affects your buying decision.
In general, suppose that a bundle of n different quality characteristics describe any bottle of premium wine: Z = z 1 , ..., z n (e.g. variety, sensory quality rating, regional origin).
Associated with this bundle is a unit price P(Z).
A hedonic price function describes the price of any particular wine i (Pw i ) as a function of its characteristics:
We assume that the market is in equilibrium. That is, consumers have made their utility-maximizing choices, given their knowledge of prices and characteristics of alternative wines and other goods. Moreover, all firms have made their profit-maximizing decisions, given their production costs and the costs of alternative wine qualities producible, and that the resulting prices and quantities clear implicit markets. Hedonic price analysis relates the price of a good to its utility-generating characteristics and yields implicit prices for these characteristics. Thus, any quantitative or qualitative variable that affects consumer utility may be included in a hedonic price function.
We formulate a model assuming that consumers, uncertain about the true sensory quality of a particular wine, adjust their willingness to pay using variety, expert quality and producer ratings as well as regional reputation as important criteria.
The theoretical model described so far does not restrict the functional form to be estimated, but it limits the type of explanatory variables. In the empirical literature on hedonic wine pricing, a variety of different functional forms have been explored and reported.
For example, Landon and Smith (1997) examine five different functions choosing the reciprocal square root form, Oczkowski (1994) reports a log-linear form, and Nerlove (1995) compares log-linear, log-log and Box-Cox transformations. Heteroskedasticity is a potential problem given the nature of the data set. In our case, when we apply a simple Breusch-Pagan test to the linear, log-linear, and log-log functio nal forms and fix the level of significance for the critical ?
2 test statistic at 1%, we cannot reject the hypothesis of homoscedasticity for the log-linear form (Breusch and Pagan 1979) . Hence log-linear is the functional form we use, with log(Price) as the dependent variable. Our examination of the correlation matrices for the coefficient estimates revealed no serious degree of multicollinearity is present in the data. Tables 2 and 4 for each of the seven or eight sub-samples of individual vintages. For the Halliday sample, the coefficients for "vintage rating" and "winery rating" measure the percentage price premiums for a one-point increase (100 point scale), respectively. Dummy variable coefficients for variety and regional origin are to be interpreted as a percentage price impact relative to Shiraz and Barossa Valley wines, respectively. The coefficient for "classic wine" reports the percentage premium for a wine that obtained this special recognition. For the Winestate sample, the coefficients for "rating" measure the percentage price premiums for a one-point increase (10 point scale), which may also be interpreted as the percentage price premium for a ½ star rating increase.
The results

Australia
Consider first the estimates using the Halliday data ( Table 2 ). The parameters for vintage rating are all significant and fairly constant over time. The price premium is 2.7% on average and varies between 2.4% to 3.8% for a one-point increase in the sensory quality rating for the '92-'98 vintages. That is, a one point increase in Halliday's quality rating would yield an increase in the price per bottle between 56 cents and $1.09on an average-priced bottle of wine over that period (see last row in Table 2 ). The coefficients for producer reputation ("winery rating") are significant for all vintages except '92. The price premium averages 6% (or A$1.41) for another star in Halliday's winery rating. However, it ranges between 3.5% and 9.3% and there appears to be a downward trend over the period analyzed.
Halliday's "classic wine" rating is significant for all vintages in Australia except '98 (which is an incomplete sample because many premium reds from that vintage were still to be released), and adds a price premium of about 27% (or A$6.50) on average, all other things equal. Again a downward trend in this coefficient is evident.
Turning to the wine variety dummies, the changes over time in the parameter values for varieties reflect relative changes in consumer tastes and preferences for the various varieties. For example, Semillon and Sauvignon Blanc parameters become less negative, that is, the price discount for them relative to Barossa Valley Shiraz decreases implying that these varieties have become less unpopular over the latter 1990s. On average they attract about a one-third discount relative to Barossa Shiraz, other things equal. For Chardonnay the discount was only half as large whereas for Riesling it averaged 50% (although less so in the late 1990s). Among the reds, Pinot Noir, Cabernet and Cabernet blends attracted similar prices to Shiraz, but Shiraz blends and other reds were sold at discounts of 10% to 20% below the Barossa Shiraz price, again all other things equal. Over time the variety parameters have become more significant.
When examining the regional dummies, notice that they become increasingly Table 4 ). For the '92 vintage, the percentage price premium for a ½-star rating increase is even higher at 15.6% which would yield an increase of A$3.12 for the average priced bottle of that vintage.
Unfortunately, the different rating schemes do not allow a direct comparison of the price premia for both data sets.
Turning to the wine variety dummies, the Winestate data also confirms that the Semillon and Sauvignon Blanc parameters become less negative, that is, the price discount for them relative to Barossa Valley Shiraz decreases implying that these varieties have become more popular over the latter 1990s. On average, they attract about a one-third discount relative to Barossa Shiraz, other things equal. For Chardonnay the discount is slightly higher in the Winestate sample (22% vs. 16%) whereas for Riesling it averaged 44% vs. 50% with Halliday's data. However, both samples confirm that the discount has declined over the 1990s. Among the reds, Pinot Noir and Merlot attracted similar prices to Shiraz (less than 5% discount), but other red varieties including Cabernet, Cabernet blends and Shiraz blends show discounts between 6% to 21% below the Barossa Shiraz price, again all other things equal.
More of these parameters have become significant as the past decade proceeded.
When examining the regional dummies, notice again that they become increasingly significant over time, although the trend is much less clear than in the Halliday sample. In the sample the only region significantly different from the Barossa Valley for the '92 vintage was Rutherglen, while for the '98 and '99 vintages half the regions are significantly different.
Again, this pattern is an indication of an intensifying regional quality differentiation in Australia, with coefficients for some regions trending down while others are trending up.
Strong upward trends are evident for the newly developing super premium cool-climate regions (e.g. Adelaide Hills, Mornington Peninsula and Tasmania).
New Zealand
The results for New Zealand, shown in Tables 3 and 5 A number of interesting results, especially when compared with Australia's, are worth highlighting. For example, the parameters for Halliday's "vintage rating" are all significant and fairly constant over time, with almost the same price premium for New Zealand as for Australia (2.0% versus 2.7% for one additional quality point over the full sample period). For the individual vintages in Halliday's data set, the premiums vary between 1.8% and 2.9% (or 33 and 68 cents calculated at the average NZ price for each vintage). The "classic wine"
parameter is almost equally significant with the premium averages 25% or NZ$5.52, about the same as for Australia. The parameters for "winery rating", however, are smaller and much less significant for New Zealand than for Australia. Variety differences are less pronounced in New Zealand, but note that Riesling is discounted by two-fifth and other whites by 24-30% relative to the base variety (Chardonnay), whereas Pinot Noir is at a slight premium and Cabernet and Merlot enjoy considerable premia, other things equal. Most strikingly, however, are the differences in the degree of regional differentiation between the two countries. For New Zealand, only two regional dummies are significantly different from the base region (Marlborough) over the full sample period, and the degree of difference is not large. Nor is any trend in significance of coefficients over time evident.
As was the case for Australia, very similar findings emerge for New Zealand from the Winestate data (Table 5) as those from the Halliday data (Table 3) : vintage ratings are nearly all significant with no obvious trend over time, variety and regional differences are not pronounced, and nor are they becoming more significant over time.
Finally on the results, note that the variation in prices explained by the model (R 2 ) in all sub-samples is always higher for New Zealand, despite much smaller sample sizes and fewer explanatory variables. Moreover, note that the estimation results are fairly consistent across the two different data sets for each country, and that the size of the price premia consumers are willing to pay for higher-rated wines is consistently less in New Zealand than in Australia (especially bearing in mind that the NZ$ was worth only 70-85 per cent of the value of the Australian dollar in the 1990s).
Implications and areas for further research
At least three clear lessons can be drawn from these results. One is that vintage ratings, winery ratings, and classic wine categorization by independent writers/critics/judges (in this case those of James Halliday and, for vintage ratings also Winestate magazine's judges) each appear to have a significant positive impact on the prices consumers are willing to pay for premium wines, after taking region and variety of wine into account. This is equally true for Australia and New Zealand. It is consistent with Schamel's (2000) findings for the United States, based in that case on ratings published in The Wine Spectator, and suggests consumers value this information in their quest for greater knowledge about available wines.
Second, the premia consumers are willing to pay for higher-rated wines (both Halliday's and Winestate's) appear to have trended downwards slightly over the 1990s. This is true also for Halliday's winery ratings.
The third lesson is not unrelated to the second. It is that there is a clear trend towards greater regional and varietal differentia tion, at least within Australia. Together these findings suggest consumers are becoming more discerning and less reliant on critics' ratings. Note, however, the much weaker regional and varietal differentiation and the absence of any The difference between the two markets in the degree of regional differentiation also may reflect the fact that Australia has more major premium regions that have been producing continuously for a long time than does New Zealand. The greater extent to which regional differentiation is increasing in Australia is partly a consequence of the rapid growth in the 1990s of new super-premium cool-climate regions, which are challenging the supremacy of the long-established regions. But another contributing factor is that, unlike New Zealand, Australia has introduced legislation (in 1993) to allow legal registration of regional names (technically, "geographical indications"). 5 That legislation is providing stronger rights over the intellectual property value of regional names, thereby raising the rates of return on investments in regional promotion. Even though they cannot say anything about the profitability of such investments, the above results are not inconsistent with the view that price premia can be generated through such promotion. The European tradition of emphasizing region in addition to nation of origin would appear to be gradually taking hold in Australia. It remains to be seen whether regional reputation indicators become less important over time as individual wineries agglomerate with globalization and put more emphasis on building their own brand reputation.
As for the signs and sizes of the premia/discounts attached to variety, they are consistent with common knowledge. But the fact that there are distinct premia for particular varieties, over and above a premium or discount for region of origin, distinguishes the Antipodes from Western Europe where varietal distinctions are down-played.
There is much scope for further empirical work of this sort. The next version of this 
